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NARRATIVE AND TIME IN INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 
Kenneth Mølbjerg Jørgensen, Lars Bo Henriksen, Lennart Nørreklit & David O’Donnell 
 
Abstract 
The contribution of the discourse on intellectual capital in terms of managing intellectual 
capital has been somewhat narrow and traditional: namely in terms of measurement, 
documentation and codification of knowledge resources. This paper argues that we need 
another framework for managing intellectual capital. We seek to construct such a 
framework by introducing narrative and time to intellectual capital management. Our 
framework for working with narrative and time is a model for construction of reality. 
Accordingly we construct reality by integrating four dimensions: facts, logic, values and 
communication. Inspired by Ricouer’s work on narrative and time, we argue that 
integration in the model is a narrative process by which time becomes human time. 
Integration is thus perceived as a mimetic circle where actors create a meaningful story 
(plot) from a diversity of events or incidents. The plot is thus a synthesis of the 
heterogeneous and it combines two temporal dimensions of narratives: the episodic and 
the configurational. Through this framework, we argue that intellectual capital 
management demands that one work with narrative integration through the dimensions 
on which this integration is obtained. 
 
Keywords: intellectual capital, narrative, time, integration, world, reality, facts, logic, 
values, communication.  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this working paper in progress is to introduce narrative and time to the 
discourse on intellectual capital and to develop some implications in relation to 
intellectual capital management. At the outset we perceive intellectual capital (IC) 
broadly as a complex dynamic process of situated collective knowing that can be 
leveraged into economic and/or social value. The reason why it is called intellectual 
capital derives from the idea that knowledge and learning have become important in 
creating economic and social value (Lundvall 1992; DMSTI (Danish Ministry of Science 
2003); probably more important economic factors than the traditional triad of land, labor 
and capital (Jørgensen 2006, p. 78; O'Donnell 2004, p. 295). As such a discourse on IC 
has emerged concerned with managing IC. We perceive this IC-discourse as a language 
game (Wittgenstein 1983) consisting of different scientific concepts, methods and tools. 
It is not well-defined but rather a network of concepts, methods and techniques that have 
quite different histories and that have emerged from different places. IC-discourse is thus 
scattered, fragmented and inconsistent (Spender 2006, p. 12). By perceiving IC-discourse 
as a language game we avoid essentialist definitions of the phenomenon in question. 
What is important is how IC-discourses are used to construct realities by academics, 
managers and practitioners. The key question is how IC-discourse intrudes into the 
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language games of everyday organizational life (Jørgensen 2006). These language games 
involve many different actors such as managers, employees, board members etc. These 
language games are where the actors’ knowledge is used, produced and reshaped 
continuously. It is the character of these games that determines the effects – the value – of 
the actors’ knowledge. Since knowledge and learning have become a more valued 
concept (Mouritsen 2004, p. 258) in today’s societies, we need better concepts and 
models for managing knowledge – that is managing intellectual capital. 
 
Thus far the contribution of the IC-discourse in terms of managing intellectual capital has 
been somewhat narrow and traditional. Overall it has suggested managing IC by 
measurement, documentation and explicit specification (codification of knowledge). IC is 
in other words “…shifting the focus of management from the tangibles to the intangibles 
under the auspices of the old doctrine of “what gets measured gets managed”. 
(Chaharbaghi and Cripps 2006, p. 30). As noted also by Chaharbaghi and Cripps (p. 30), 
such an approach devalues IC’s inherently tangible nature, because it is impossible and 
undesirable to reduce IC to a calculable number. Of course there are scholars who are 
aware of the problems of measuring IC, and they have come up with different suggestions 
for repairing or modifying this approach to IC management. Mouritsen for example 
suggests that an IC statement creates knowledge of how knowledge is created, developed 
and applied in organizations and that such statements can be used to intervene in 
organizations. 
“Presenting the composition, upgrade and use of knowledge resources over 
time…, the intellectual capital statement puts forwards evaluative questions: 
Do we like it? Where should it be changed? Can we agree on new measures? 
Such questions are managerial ones because they help managers to change 
knowledge resources and direct them towards new strategies” (Mouritsen 
2004, p. 259). 
 
We are generally sympathetic to the idea that in the knowledge economy, organizations 
need some measure of their knowledge assets in order to provide them with more 
financial possibilities. But it is a fundamental mistake – and a potentially dangerous one - 
to suggest that these measures can ever be used effectively for intellectual capital 
management no matter if these measurements are used in a dialogue between managers 
and employees. The problem here is that people still pay serious attention to these 
measures. Thus, it would not remove the fundamental problem that management by such 
measures would be management by illusion. The fundamental misunderstanding of IC-
discourse is that it tries to produce measures or codification of what knowledge resources 
are, which is a hopeless endeavour. On this matter, our position is similar to Chaharbaghi 
and Cripp’s position that “…the legitimacy of measurement schemes in the context of 
intellectual capital is so dubious that it makes them unworthy of serious scholarly 
attention” (Chaharbaghi and Cripps 2006, pp. 30-31). An important branch of the IC-
discourse, knowledge management (KM), runs into these problems when it tries to codify 
knowledge. KM is strongly influenced by Nonaka and Takeuchi’s account of tacit-
explicit knowledge conversion in Japan’s knowledge creating companies (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995). The problem in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model is however that their 
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work has helped to institutionalize an erroneous account of Polanyis account of tacit 
knowing (Ray and Clegg 2007, p. 163) and have “…contributed to a craze in which KM 
practitioners seek to make tacit knowing explicit by finding a way to “express the 
inexpressible”” (Ray and Clegg 2005, p. 320). But this is directly contrary to Polanyi’s 
argument, which was that tacit knowing represented an inexpressible tacit coefficient to 
every thought and action (Polanyi 1958; Polanyi 1966; Polanyi 1969; Hall 1979). ”KM 
appears to be a bewitchment of our intelligence by the language of explicit knowledge 
says Ray and Clegg (Ray and Clegg 2007, p. 164) by reframing a famous phrase from 
Wittgenstein: ”Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language” (Ray and Clegg 2007, p. 164; Wittgenstein 1983, § 109). The 
inevitable conclusion is that much KM and IC-discourse has misunderstood IC-
management and has misinterpreted problems of IC-management in organizations.  
 
We argue here that one of the problems of IC-discourse is the fact that it doesn’t pay any 
attention to narrative and time when it addresses IC-management. By measuring or 
codifying knowledge it implicitly seeks to go beyond being and time. The results are that 
these numbers and words become entirely meaningless or alternatively that they can be 
interpreted in all kinds of different ways depending on the interests and intentions of the 
interpreters. The problem here is that narrative and time are fundamental conditions of 
human existence (Ricouer 1984, p. 52) – a point which we return to in more substantive 
detail below. Narrating is thus a description of the ways in which humans construct 
meaning and in this process it places activities and people in a specific temporality. This 
means that activities are attached with temporal significance which makes them 
meaningful and which means that people do and say particular things and relate to other 
people in specific ways. To construct meaning is not just saying and doing things – it is 
also to see activities as part of a greater context. Narrating thus reflects the process which 
Wenger refers to as imagination (Wenger 1998, p. 175-178) and which is integrated in 
practice. Narrating places events in time and place. It is based on experiences made by 
people during their course of life. But it goes beyond the past and the immediate now and 
extends itself into the future by giving a sense of direction in life. Narrating creates a 
dynamic relationship between past, present and future and provides a sense of continuity. 
Referring to Dewey (1916, 1991), Clandinin and Connelly for example note that 
  
”…Dewey held that one criterion of experience is continuity, namely the 
notion that experiences grow out of other experiences, and experiences lead 
to further experiences. Wherever one positions oneself in that continuum – 
the imagined now, some imagined past or some imagined future – each point 
has a past experiential base and leads to an experiential future” (Clandinin 
and Connelly 2000, p. 2).  
 
Knowledge is about using language and symbols to construct reality but this construction 
of reality is not limited to the now. It is extended in time through the imaginative process 
of narrating. It is one of the reasons that measuring or codifying knowledge is simply too 
complex and hardly worth while – who can construct a calculable number or express in 
words the process of imagination. Tacit integration of elements, which is Polanyi’s 
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description of how people construct knowledge, is here very similar to the integration 
process – that is emplotment - by which people construct narratives (see later). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the creation of a new framework for 
understanding intellectual capital management – a framework where the understanding of 
narrative and time plays a significant role. Our framework for working with narrative and 
time is a model of reality construction. According to the model actors construct reality by 
integrating four dimensions: facts, logic, values and communication (Henriksen, Nørreklit 
et al. 2004; Nørreklit, Israelsen et al. 2005). We argue that the process by which these 
dimensions are integrated is a narrative process where activities are given temporal 
significance through the process of emplotment. Through the narrative we construct 
reality, which is that which works for us (Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004, p. 17). Reality 
is equal to what Ricouer calls human time characterized by the fact that it is articulated 
through a narrative mode. The idea here is that this human time must be integrated with 
what we call facts or world, which consists of chronological or episodic time. IC-
management - and management - in general is about creating the conditions for 
integration of world and reality. This in turn is characterized as a narrative process where 
the different dimensions of reality construction are integrated. We will especially use 
Ricouer’s work on narrative and time in describing this kind of integration, perceived as a 
mimetic circle where actors create a meaningful story (plot) from a diversity of events or 
incidents. The plot is thus a synthesis of the heterogeneous and it combines two temporal 
dimensions of narratives: the episodic dimension and the configurational dimension. The 
first relates to world, while the latter relates to reality. Through this framework, we argue 
that intellectual capital management demands that one work with narrative integration. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First we present the model for reality 
construction and its components and briefly relate this to IC. Second we delve deeper into 
the integration process of the four components by relating Ricouer’s work on narrative 
and time to the model. In particular, we describe the mimetic circle within which 
narratives emerge. We then identify and describe IC-management challenges by drawing 
on this framework. We conclude ……….. 
 
Construction of reality 
Our framework for working with time draws on a model of reality construction that we 
worked with in a project on radical change in organizations (Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 
2004). The model proposes that actors construct their realities by integrating four 
dimensions: facts, logic, values and communication. The idea in the model is to visualize 
some important dimensions of reality construction that go in daily life through our 
participation in what we inspired by Wittgenstein call language games (Wittgenstein 
1983). As such our basic ontological position is that reality becomes socially constructed 
by playing language games (Jørgensen 2007). Language games or communication is thus 
central in understanding organizational processes. It is through language games that 
organizations - and the actors that constitute the organization – act. Facts, logic and 
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values are thus integrated in the same speech acts. They are not distinct processes but 
merged in the speaking of language – that is, in communication with others. In the 
following we will present the model and its core concepts. The model is illustrated below 
(Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004, p. 17-22): 
 
Model 1: Construction of reality 
 




VALUES  COMMUNICATION 
 
Facts comprise the world. It consists of chronological or episodic events. We may divide 
this notion of time into two modes: Cosmic time (Kemp 1999) comprises natural forces in 
the world: wind, weather, tide, gravity, water, earthquakes, tsunamis, biological and 
ecological forces etc. Objectified time comprises forces in the world produced by human 
life. It includes norms, traditions, conventions and their manifestations in words, 
concepts, symbols, artifacts etc. Facts are the raw material for construction of reality. In 
other words, facts comprise the historical and geographical conditions for the actors’ 
construction of reality. These facts are objectively present but they are also to some 
extent objectifications of actors’ constructions of reality, which thus become part of the 
conditions for future constructions of reality. Facts have probably become increasingly 
dynamic as we have entered the globalized economy (Bauman 2004). The relationship 
between cosmic time and objectified time is also probably more and more interdependent 
since human actions to a higher degree interfere with natural forces (pollutions, global 
warming etc.). Since facts are expressed in words and symbols, they are paradoxical, 
contradictory and equivocal and are potentially open to a lot of different interpretations 
(Wittgenstein 1983). Facts are “what is happening” – a chronicle (Czarniawska 2004, p. 
23). Since facts are used to construct reality, they are also used to construct identity; that 
is facts constitute what is called identity capital (Pullen 2005). Since facts are, to a large 
extent, dependant on human life, they are also negotiable. The relationship between facts 
and reality are thus not necessarily one of adaptation of reality to facts; the relationship – 
or the meaning - is negotiated (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998). 
 
Reality is different from world (facts). Reality is our sense of, our knowledge of and our 
feelings for this world. Reality is how we construct the world. Our reality is that which 
works for us (Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004, p. 17). We only know the world through 
this construction of it. The relationship between reality and world is constructed through 
language games (Clegg 1975; Wittgenstein 1983; Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004; 
Jørgensen 2007) - caught in the communication dimension in the model. This suggests 
that we use language as a toolbox for constructing realities. It also implies that using 
language and playing language games is an active process of constructing reality. 
Language is in other words not an objective mirror of reality as argued in Wittgenstein’s 
early philosophy (Wittgenstein 2001). We play language games according to the 
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contextual rules-of-the-game in a particular culture (Clegg 1975; Hardy and Clegg 1996; 
Shotter 2005; Jørgensen and Dehlin 2006). These rules are often tacit and have the 
character of norm, tradition, convention, use, etc. That is, they are historically created 
ways of talking and acting that have been learned and interiorized through upbringing, 
education and participation in the cultural life of particular families, organizations, 
communities and other social groups. Communication is central in talking about reality as 
socially constructed. It would be impossible to talk about culture, community, society or 
history without communication (Dewey 1916; Geertz 1973; Bruner 1996). 
Communication or dialogue is thus a matter of life and death for any organization 
(Gergen, Gergen et al. 2004).  
 
Playing language games is important for human existence. We may say that the world is 
reduced to reality through the process of playing language games in the sense that 
construction of reality is an identification process that seeks to reduce different events 
into the same. Playing language games is thus equal to what in the literature is referred to 
as narrating (Boje 2001; Chappell, Rhodes et al. 2003; Czarniawska 2004; Sfard and 
Prusak 2005). Narrating is about giving sense and coherence to what we do; it is an effort 
to create unity and consistency from material that is otherwise just a flowing soup (Boje 
2001, p. 2). Narrating is thus the active process by which reality is created. It creates 
“sameness” in the sense of constructing similarities between events – not in seeing them 
as the same. As such construction of reality is to construct a familiar world for the actors. 
We draw here on the notion of family resemblance, which is Wittgenstein’s solution to 
the question of how we are capable of using the rules of the game in new situations. We 
are capable of using language but not because situations are basically the same but 
because they look alike other situations. Instead of situations being the same there are 
networks of similarities that overlap and criss-cross each other (Wittgenstein 1983, § 67). 
In dealing with everyday situations, actors draw on how they have learned to use 
language in similar situations – thereby constructing reality. They use the past to 
construct the present. Through family resemblance, situations are made relatively similar. 
But family resemblance is not only recognition but is also a construction. It is a 
projection from the individual to the world. Therefore construction is also a matter of 
identification. Even if world and reality are different from each other, reality construction 
actually constitutes the actors’ endless efforts to reduce the world to something that is 
familiar to them – that is creating sameness between world and reality. Reality 
construction is in this way an identification process, which is essential for our very 
existence. Identification is a way of making reality manageable through an active process 
of construction, whereby meaning is projected from the body to the world in a way where 
the meaning is projected away from us (Polanyi 1958; Polanyi 1966). As such reality is a 
projection where the projection is the result of a learning process. Knowledge goes from 
the body to the world and we depend on the body in our actions and understandings. We 
know the body from what it does in the world. Hall describes it as follows: “Insofar as I 
act, I am not conscious of myself but from myself” (Hall 1979, p. 276). Hall also uses the 
description “participating in” to denote the active process by which we create reality. “On 
this epistemology, I am not a detached, impersonal observer in knowing, but on the 
contrary, I pour myself into things.” (Hall 1979, p. 275). 
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In transforming facts to reality, two other dimensions are important according to the 
model. The first dimension is logic, which denotes the process that transforms facts to 
possibilities. It is through logical processes that facts are transformed into future 
possibilities and choices. There are different kinds of logic: material, formal, social or 
subjective. A material logic describes rules, procedures and guidelines embedded in 
material technologies or systems like accounting systems, budget systems, quality 
systems, production systems etc. Formal logic comprises the kinds of logic that can be 
found in mathematics and scientific theories. Subjective logic comprises the individuals 
learned way of creating possibilities from particular situations: This includes the use of 
methods, systematic ways of thinking etc. It is logic that may have been interiorized 
through upbringing, experience or formal education. Social logic comprises socially 
produced conditions for transforming facts into possibilities; that is that the organization 
of social life conditions what kinds of logic that may come into play in creating new 
possibilities. A logical process is a rational process that creates a pattern or consistent 
picture of events, which are often fragmented and opaque. Even if many kinds of logic 
seeks to go beyond time and space in the sense of being manifestations of more 
generalized ideas about the relationship between events and their interpretation, the use of 
logic is never beyond time and space. It is used by actors with different intentions and 
interests and under different circumstances. Therefore the meaning of management 
concepts, for example, cannot simply be understood by analyzing the management 
concepts in themselves. They must be understood through how they are translated 
(Tryggestad 1995; Latour 1996; Czarniawska and Joerges 1998; Sevon 1998) or 
transformed (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000) into organizational action. This also goes for 
methods and concepts used in IC-management like KM (mentioned before) or The 
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1992; Kaplan and Norton 1996). This is because 
the dimension called values is also integrated in construction of reality. If our actions 
were only controlled by logical processes our reality would be completely instrumental 
and lifeless. But this is of course not the case. By doing something we don’t just do 
something we also attach to these actions temporal significance as noted above. We 
create temporal significance through our values. Values comprise what is important and 
valuable for us. Values determine what we like and dislike. Values create meaning in life 
and they constitute our point of direction in life. It is through values that we assess 
possibilities as serious, inspiring, threatening, reprehensible or unimportant. Actions are 
thus symbolic (Geertz 1973) and linked to the temporality of our existence. Through our 
values we extend ourselves in time, because values are embedded in how we experience 
the past, present and imagined futures and how we construct continuity between past, 
present and future. Since the meaning of IC-management concepts and methods in this 
way depend on actors’ intentions and interests, IC-management is also always influenced 
by the relations of power that exist in organizations (Jørgensen 2006; Jørgensen 2007) 
whereby IC-management may turn into “tyrannies of truth” (see for example) (O'Donnell, 
Henriksen & Voelpel, 2006; Voelpel, Leibold et al. 2006). 
 
We have now described the components of the model and we will now try to answer the 
questions about its implications and challenges in relation to IC-management. One of the 
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central challenges for IC-management is the integration of world and reality. The 
management task becomes to intervene in the language games in order to ensure 
integration between IC-actors’ construction of reality and the world. That is the role of 
management is to give a sense of direction in the world. It is a strategic task, which 
relates to one of the major forces behind the emergence of IC-discourse: namely the 
development from industrial economy to innovation economy (Lundvall 1992; Voelpel, 
Leibold et al. 2006) or learning economy (Lundvall and Johnson 1994), and which is 
characterized by an increasing speed of change. This means that IC-actors in particular to 
a higher degree must relate to many changes and thus to new conditions for construction 
of reality. This puts pressure on the narrative process by which we create consistency in 
life, and whereby we try to reduce the world to reality. Bauman speaks about an identity 
crisis (Bauman 2004) created by the ever increasing speed of change in the global world. 
Identity is thus under pressure by constant changes. Speaking from the model, this is an 
indication that facts (world) in the form of cosmic and objectified time are more dynamic. 
The task of management is to create the conditions that IC-managers and practitioners 
can create sustainable narratives in a time of increasing pressure and make sure that our 
realities actually work, which is to ensure that our language does not become obsolete. 
 
The management task is thus mediating between world and reality in the sense that the 
manager continuously needs to create the conditions that the organization and its actors 
can create a meaningful position in the interplay with customers, suppliers, competitors, 
partners, managers, employees and other groups and organizations. The contribution of 
IC-discourse in relation to this task has been new ways of measuring and controlling 
people. This is an industrial economy management approach, which has become obsolete 
in the innovation economy. Instead it belongs to the industrial economy. In our model, 
the management task is a communicative task, which needs to contribute to the 
integration of world and reality. Logic plays an important part, because logic helps 
identifying future possibilities in the world. IC-logic thus comprises the techniques, 
methods and concepts that are used by IC-managers and IC-practitioners in order to 
systematize and organize the dynamics of the world and thus in order to identify for 
actors what they can do. This is no matter if logic is embedded in systems, procedures 
and technologies, in social systems or in the actors’ subjective logic. There is an 
important temporal dimension in logic, since logic helps in translating cosmic and 
objectified time to human time (see next section) thereby identifying future possibilities 
for the actors. But it is equally important that these possibilities are integrated with 
actors’ values so that the actors may construct a meaningful and desirable future. The 
energy of innovation and learning lies in values. Therefore it is important that any 
management approach and especially IC-management approach take their starting point 
in the actors and what they would like to do. When IC-managers mediate between world 




Narrative and time are integrated as important aspects in the model for construction of 
reality and thus in understanding the integration of facts, logic, values and 
communication. But we have not yet in any comprehensive fashion described, how this 
integration looks like. It is especially here that we believe that Ricouer’s work on 
narrative and time (Ricouer 1984; Ricouer 1985; Ricouer 1988) can be used. We draw on 
his descriptions of threefold mimesis, which appears in Volume 1 of Time and Narrative. 
It is our ambition that describing the integration process in this way will make it possible 
to understand and to work with integration in relation to IC-management.  
 
Ricouer’s work on time and narrative is perhaps also the most comprehensive work in the 
field of narrative research, and therefore most other authors in organization studies build 
extensively on Ricoeur’s work and concepts (e.g. Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004; 
Chappell, Rhodes et al. 2003, pp. 47-48). As noted by Czarniawska:  
 
”Among all those there was, and is, the formidable presence of Paul Ricouer, 
who took into consideration those aspects of various schools that related to 
his main interest: the relation between temporality and narrative” 
(Czarniawska 2004, p. 2). 
 
However, there are problems also in Ricouer’s work, which relates to his conception of 
power and therefore also his conception of narrative. The three core concepts of narrative, 
chronicle, emplotment and mimesis (Czarniawska 2004, p. 23), are closely related to 
Ricouer’s work. Chronicle is  “what is happening” and is to be perceived as the dynamics 
of cosmic and objectified time. Mimesis is the representation of the world in a text. 
Mimesis is thus where world becomes reality. Finally, there is emplotment, which is a 
structure that makes sense of events and creates a unity of events dispersed in time and 
space. 
 
The relationship between time and narrative is the focus point of Ricouer’s work. 
Between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal character of human experience, 
there is a correlation which is not incidental but must be perceived as a transcultural 
necessity. Ricouer’s hypothesis is that time understood as chronological time becomes 
human time to the extent that it is articulated in a narrative mode, and that narrative 
attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of human existence. 
 
“To put it another way, time becomes human to the extent that it is 
articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning 
when it becomes a condition of human existence” (Ricouer 1984, p. 52). 
 
Ricouer explores the relations between time and narrative through what he calls three 
moments of mimesis: mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3. What brings these moments 
together is the power of configuration. His thesis is that the meaning comprised by the 
power of configuration, and which results in emplotment, is the result of the intermediary 
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position between two operations which Ricouer calls mimesis1 and mimesis3 and which 
constitutes the two sides of mimesis2. His idea is thus that mimesis2 draws its 
intelligibility from its faculty of mediation, which takes us from one side of a text to 
another (Ricouer 1984, p. 53) through the power of configuration. This procedure is 
contrary to the scientific procedure, which Ricouer calls the semiotics of a text (p. 53). 
Ricouer’s approach, on the other hand, is hermeneutical and the hermeneutical task is to 
reconstruct the set of operations, whereby a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of 
life, action and suffering and to be given by an author to readers who through their 
reception of the work change their acting. Semiotic theory is, according to Ricouer, only 
interested in the literary text. Hermeneutics, however, is interested in “…the entire arc of 
operations by which practical experience provides itself with works, authors, and readers. 
It does not confine itself to setting mimesis2 between mimesis1 and mimesis3. It wants to 
characterize mimesis2 by its mediating function” (Ricouer 1984, p. 53). Ricouer’s 
approach is thereby hermeneutical in Gadamer’s sense of the word, because Gadamer 
also describes hermeneutics as a basic approach to life rather than narrowly confined to 
the interpretation of a text (Gadamer 1992). Hermeneutics is concerned with the interplay 
between history, text and actor, and it is also here, that Ricouer locates the play from 
mimesis1 to mimesis3 through mimesis2. He suggests that what is at stake is the process 
by which the textual configuration mediates through the prefiguration of the practical 
field and its refiguration in the reception of the work. It is the reader, who is the operator, 
which by means of acting – the action of reading – creates the unity that criss-crosses 
from mimesis1 to mimesis3 through mimesis2 (Ricouer 1984, p. 53). The relations 
between mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3 constitute in this way “…the dynamics of 
emplotment”, that is how plot is shaped. It is this dynamic, which for Ricouer is the 
central element in the description of the relations between time and narrative. Ricouer 
will in other words solve the problem of the relations between time and narrative by 
showing the mediating role, that emplotment has between the moment of practical 
experience, which goes before emplotment, and the moment of refiguration that follows 
it.   
 
“I propose to disentangle them from the act of textual configuration and to show the 
mediating role of the time of emplotment between the temporal aspects prefigured 
in the practical field and the refiguration of our temporal experience by this 
constructed time. We are following therefore the destiny of a prefigured time that 
becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a configured time” (Ricouer 
1984, p. 54). 
 
In this way human existence is circular, because emplotment always emerges on the 
background of a prefigured time, that becomes a refigured time through the power of 
configuration. Narratives are created within a “circle of mimesis” (Ricouer 1984, pp. 71-
76) “…where endpoints (post-understandings) lead back to or anticipate starting points, 
and incorporate pre-understandings of semantic structures, symbolic resources and 
temporal characteristics” (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, pp. 270-271) (see also their 
summary of Ricouer’s argument, p. 270).  
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When we use the mimetic circle as a description of the integration of facts, logic, values 
and communication, it is because the mimetic circle in many ways draws on the same 
elements, which are however ordered differently than in our model. Ricouer’s argument 
is that narrative rests on a pre-understanding of the world. For Ricouer this pre-
understanding is threefold: It is an understanding of its meaningful structures, symbolic 
resources and its temporal character (Ricouer 1984, p. 54). Firstly, pre-understanding 
rests in the competence to utilize “… the conceptual network that structurally 
distinguishes the domain of action from that of physical movement” (pp. 54-55). Humans 
have in their practical life concepts to understand what action is in relation to physical 
processes (Kemp 1999, p. 37). Narrative involves a familiarity and understanding of 
concepts such as goals, motives, agents, means, cooperation, competition, struggle, 
success, failure etc. (p. 55). The relation between this practical understanding and the 
narrative understanding is two-fold. It is a relation that is based on presupposition and of 
transformation. Every narrative presupposes an understanding of concepts like the ones 
mentioned above. But narrative is not limited to the use of concepts in the conceptual 
network. Narrative adds to it discursive features, that puts the sentences and concepts in a 
composition, which means that more than loosely coupled sentences and concepts emerge 
(see also Kemp 1999, p. 37). This is the ”…syntagmatic order of discourse…, which 
implies the irreducibly diachronic character of every narrated story” (Ricouer 1984, p. 
56), and which is contrary the to synchronic paradigmatic structure of the conceptual 
network. In sum the relationship between narrative understanding and practical 
understanding is as follows.  
 
“In passing from the paradigmatic order of action to the syntagmatic order of 
narrative, the terms of the semantics of action acquire integration and 
actuality. Actuality because the terms, which had only a virtual signification 
in the paradigmatic order, that is, a pure capacity to be used receive an actual 
(effective) signification thanks to the sequential interconnections the plot 
confers on the agents, their deeds, and their sufferings. Integration because 
terms as heterogeneous as agents, motives and circumstances are rendered 
compatible and work together in actual temporal wholes” (Ricouer 1984, pp. 
56-57). 
 
In our model this meaningful structure would correspond to logic; that is the 
competencies that actors possess in relation to the creation of possibilities in the world. 
There is a familiarity in using language and other techniques and means that are available 
for action the creation of possibilities in a dynamic world. This includes the ability to use 
structures in the social system (social logic), the ability to use techniques, methods and 
concepts that are learning and interiorized (subjective logic), and the ability to use 
systems and technologies (formal logic and material logic).  
 
But pre-understanding in Ricouer’s framework also rests on other elements; namely that 
facts (world) are communicated in symbols and that there are particular values such as 
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rules and norms that govern the use of symbols in everyday life. Ricouer calls this the 
symbolic resources of the practical field. According to Ricouer, this second feature of 
pre-understanding governs the aspects of acting, to be capable of acting and knowing-
how to act. He argues, that if human action can be narrated at all, it is because it is 
already articulated in signs, rules and norms. In this respect, Ricouer draws on 
anthropologists like Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1973) and Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer 1999), 
which implies that ”…symbolism is not in the mind, not a psychological operation 
destined to guide action, but a meaning incorporated into action and decipherable from it 
by other actors in the social interplay” (Ricouer 1984, p. 57). In addition the concept 
symbol signals the symbolic system’s structurating character. This means that to 
understand a ritual act, it must be situated in a ritual, a cultural system and thereby within 
the whole network of conventions, presumptions and institutions that constitute the 
symbolic framework of culture (pp. 57-58). It is because of the symbolic network, that we 
can interpret signs as meaning one or the other. The symbolic network ensures that 
narrative actions can be read and understood by the audience of the storyteller. 
Symbolism introduces ideas of rules and norms, which means that actions can be 
assessed and evaluated, that is judged on the background of moral preferences. Actions 
thus attain a relative value, which says that such and such actions are more valuable than 
others (pp. 58-59). In this way this second feature of pre-understanding operates with 
facts as mediated through symbols but also that these must be understood and interpreted 
within a cultural system (a set of language games), and that the use of language is 
assessed and evaluated from norms and values.   
 
Finally, values are also present in the last feature of pre-understanding in Ricouer’s 
framework, and which relates to the temporal features on which narratives are 
configured. “It goes so far as to recognize in action temporal structures that call for 
narration” (Ricouer 1984, p. 59). There are inductors that invite for narrating. This is not 
just about recognizing temporal dimensions of our understandings of actions (past, 
present and future). The coupling of the different dimensions are more important, not at 
least what Ricouer, with reference to Augustine, calls the threefold present: the present of 
the future, the present of the past and the present of the present.  
 
“The present of the future? Henceforth, that is, from now on, I commit 
myself to doing that tomorrow. The present of the past? Now I intend to do 
that because I just realized that….The present of the present? Now I am 
doing it, because now I can do it. The actual present of doing something 
bears witness to the potential present of the capacity to do something and is 
constituted as the present of the present” (Ricouer 1984, p. 60).  
 
However, according to Ricouer this phenomenology of action can be developed even 
further. 
 
”What counts here is the way in which everyday praxis orders the present of 
the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present in terms of 
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one another. For it is this practical articulation that constitutes the most 
elementary inductor of narrative” (Ricouer 1984, p. 60).  
 
Ricouer draws on Heidegger’s concept within-time-ness (being-within-time), which is 
described in Heidegger’s principal work Being and Time (Heidegger 1962). Ricouer uses 
it to show the temporal structures in our actions. According to Ricouer, the temporal 
structure embedded in being-within-time is the structure, which we are most likely to 
represent as a linear representation of time; that is as a simple succession of abstract 
“nows.” Within time-ness is defined as a simple characteristic of Care; that we are thrown 
among things and must care about them. But because within time-ness is deduced from 
Care and of the perception of time as historical time, it cannot be understood as linear 
time (what Heidegger referred to as vulgar time; Ricouer 1984, p. 62; Kemp 1999, p. 40). 
 
”Being-”within”-time is above all to reckon with time and, as a consequence 
of this, to calculate. It is because we do reckon with time and do calculations 
that we must have recourse to measuring, not vice versa. It must be possible, 
therefore, to give an existential description of this “reckoning with” before 
the measurement it calls for. Here expressions such as “have the time to,” 
“take the time to,” “to lose time,” etc. are very revealing” (Ricouer 1984, p. 
62).  
 
Similar things can be said about adverbs like: then, after, later, earlier, since, so long as, 
during, all the while that, not that, etc. All these expressions are according to Ricouer 
oriented towards the datable and public character of the time of preoccupation. 
 
”Yet it always preoccupation that determines the meaning of this time, not 
the things we care about”…”…a day is not an abstract measure; it is a length 
that corresponds to our Care and the world in which it is “time to” do 
something, where “now” signifies “now that…” It is the time of works and 
days” (Ricouer 1984, p. 63).  
 
As such it is on the background of actors’ intentions and interests (their values), that time 
cannot be represented as a linear succession of abstract nows. Time is “time to do 
something” and therefore our preoccupation determines the meaning of time.  
 
Narrative integration thus rests on a pre-understanding of human action: On this 
foundation, the integrative process called mimesis2 by Ricouer is constructed, and 
which is broadly known as the plot (see for example, Boje 2001, p. 2; Chappell, 
Rhodes et al. 2003, pp. 47-48; Henriksen, Nørreklit et al. 2004, p. 44). According to 
Ricouer, plot mediates in three different ways: First it mediates between the individual 
events and the story as a whole: “…It draws a meaningful story from a diversity of 
events or incidents (Aristotle’s pragmata) that it transforms the events or incidents into 
a story … In short, emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a 
single succession” (Ricouer 1984, p. 65).  Secondly, the plot draws together 
heterogeneous factors such as “ … agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, 
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unexpected results” (Ricouer 1984, p. 65). To take a simple example from the 
literature: “We teach and they learn” (Chappell, Rhodes et al. 2003, p. 45) has all the 
characteristics that define a narrative. It sequences and emplots events over time (the 
first characteristic of plot). It defines characters and roles, motives, interactions and 
relations of power between participants in the story. Finally plot mediates in a third 
way: “ … that of its temporal characteristics. These allow us to call plot, by means of 
generalization, a synthesis of the heterogeneous” (Ricouer 1984, p. 66). Emplotment 
combines in different ways two temporal dimensions, one chronological and one that 
is not: “The former constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the 
story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the configurational dimension 
properly speaking, thanks to which the plot transforms events into a story” (Ricouer 
1984, p. 66). Plot provides an end point of the story, which organizes the individual 
events, and which makes it possible to follow a story. This end point of the story, its 
conclusion, must be acceptable as congruent with the events brought together in 
narrative (pp. 66-67). The final stage of the mimetic circle is called mimesis3. With 
reference to Gadamer (1992), this stage corresponds to “application” (Ricouer 1984, p. 
70). Mimesis3 is where “the world of the text” intersects with the hearer/reader. It is 
where reality construction is manifested in words and actions and become the object of 
“public” attention and where it undergoes inter-subjective negotiation. 
 
Narrative integration and IC-management 
As noted before, the management task is to mediate between world and reality. The IC-
manager has a special task in designing the context for IC-practitioners’ constructions of 
reality and in ensuring that IC-practitioners can create a meaningful position in the world. 
We may call this kind of integration a “valid” reality. The special challenge in 
constructing “valid” realities in the innovation economy is that world has become more 
dynamic and fluent. A non-valid reality is thus where world and reality drift apart, which 
in terms of the narrative vocabulary may be compared with situations where the mimetic 
circle evolves into a vicious circle or on the contrary that the continuity in reality 
construction breaks apart. Ricouer has some considerations in regard to the first problem 
– that the mimetic circle evolves into a vicious circle. Ricouer believes that it can be 
refuted that it is a vicious circle. Instead he argued that it is an endless spiral.  
 
“I would rather speak of an endless spiral that would carry the mediation past 
the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes” (Ricouer 1984; 
p. 72). 
 
The claim of the presence of a vicious circle is that the endpoint leads back to the starting 
point, or worse that the end point is anticipated in the starting point. In other words, 
narrative would be nothing but repetition of prejudices and pre-understandings of an 
almost static “dynamic” between mimesis1 and mimesis3. This is of course problematic 
in a dynamic world like the innovation economy because world and reality would quickly 
disintegrate. But Ricouer does not believe that the circle is necessarily a vicious circle. 
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According to Ricouer, the claim of a vicious circle stems from two interpretations of 
circularity. The first concerns the violence of interpretation, which is the case when 
narrative creates an illusion which cannot sustain the demand for honesty. But this claim 
stems from our inclination to say that  “…narrative puts consonance where there was 
only dissonance” (Ricouer 1984, p. 72). But this is a reflection of a nostalgia where we 
cling to the idea “… that order is our homeland despite everything” (Ricouer 1984, p. 72). 
This argument, however, rests on the assumptions that discordance is put on one side and 
concordance on the other side in the relationship between time and narrative.  But this is a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the dialectical relationship between time and narrative. 
Firstly because our experience of time cannot simply be reduced to discordance. 
According to Ricouer, Augustine’s analyses of time reject that assumption when he 
argues that time unities distention and intention. Secondly, narrative is not simply 
concordance.  
 
“Emplotment is never the simple triumph of ‘order’. Even the paradigm of 
Greek tragedy makes a place for the upsetting role of the peripeteia, those 
contingencies and reversals of fortune that solicit horror and pity. The plots 
themselves coordinate distention and intention” (Ricouer 1984, p. 73).  
 
In other words, narrative draws together heterogeneous factors into a unity but this unity 
is not the triumph of order. The major advantage of narrative in organization studies is 
perhaps precisely that it organizes heterogeneity at the same time as it allows for 
heterogeneity – that is, it allows for internal tensions, sudden reversals, contingencies etc. 
that are the results of human actions. Organization science is then to unravel complex 
cases of where the organization researcher, like a detective, follows the clues behind the 
emergence of organizational events in order to figure out who had done it, why, when and 
how it happened. The vicious circle can also be the result that the narrative is redundant, 
which is the case when mimesis3 doesn’t add anything to mimesis1. ”Mimesis2 would 
then only restore to mimesis3, what it had taken from mimesis1, since mimesis1, would 
already be at work of mimesis3” (Ricouer, 1984, p. 74). On this point, Ricouer suggests 
that there is “…a prenarrative quality of experience” and further: “Without leaving 
everyday experience, are we not inclined to see in a given sequence of the episodes of our 
lives “(as yet) untold” stories, stories that demand to be told that offer anchorage points 
for narrative?” (Ricouer, 1984, p. 74). He mentions two examples: the patient that speaks 
to the psychoanalyst tells fragments of stories. In this case the purpose of such sessions is 
to deduce a narrative which is more supportable and intelligible. As such a told life story 
emerges from untold and repressed stories. In the second example, Ricouer talks about 
the judge who tries to understand a course of actions “ … by unraveling the tangle of 
plots the subject is caught up in. The accent here is on “being entangled”…a verb whose 
passive voice emphasizes that the story “happens” to someone before anyone tells it” (pp. 
74-75). The told story is simply the continuation of these untold stories. The art of 
narrating is thus not something that is artificial or redundant. 
 
”We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit 
being narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the 
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necessity to save the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history 
of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative” (Ricouer 1984, p. 
75).  
 
In this way, Ricouer refutes the claim that the circle is a vicious one. Our narratives and 
our realities evolve all the time. But the question in this context is whether narrating 
evolves into valid realities. Narrating interprets world but this interpretation is not an 
independent or open interpretation but is influenced by the conditions in which it takes 
place. The refutation of the presence of a vicious circle touches on this aspect but not to 
the necessary extent. In any case Cunliffe, Luhmann and Boje offer two amendments to 
Ricoeur’s approach. The first amendment emphasizes performance. 
 
Be it resolved that Ricouer’s position on narrative and time needs to be expanded to consider 
the context or space of narrative performances. We are not studying already constructed 
narratives, rather narratives are performances in the moment, “a product of imaginative 
construction” (Mink 1978: 145). Life is lived in the moment and much of our sense-making 
also occurs in the moment.” (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 272). 
 
This amendment is proposed because, Ricouer does not sufficiently pay attention to the 
diegetic aspects of narratives but only rely on the mimetic aspect in his mimetic circle. 
This amendment extends Ricouer’s hermeneutical position towards a more post-structural 
or postmodern position and it relates to the delicate balance, whether narrating is 
subjectively or inter-subjectively constructed. On this matter Ricouer has, according to 
Cunliffe, Luhmann and Boje, a tendency to emphasize the narrator, where the post-
structural or postmodern position emphasizes the context and spaces where the narrative 
is constructed – a viewpoint that makes the narrative more dynamic, liquid and adaptable 
to the circumstances of its construction. These circumstances comprise other actors with 
whom we engage. That means that an important aspect of reality construction becomes 
more visible – namely the relations of power and how they influence the narrative (Hardy 
and Clegg 1996; Ainsworth and Hardy 2004; Clegg, Courpasson et al. 2006; Jørgensen 
2007). By emphasizing performance, narrating becomes more situated and relational but 
also influenced by other actors in different positions and with different intentions and 
interests. The results may be manifold. In some cases we might imagine that the 
situational and relational aspects will enforce the development of narrative, which 
thereby avoids that the narrative repeats itself. On the other hand, we might suggest 
completely the opposite – that it will enforce a vicious circle in the sense of enforcing 
particular narratives of world or that the fundamental relation between activity and 
imagination in narrating becomes arbitrary and illusory. People narrate in order to make 
sense of the world but this narrating may exactly be a violence of interpretation – but not 
in the sense that narratives do not evolve – but in the sense that these narratives conceal, 
mask and hide what we are really doing. This relates to Foucauldian analysis in the sense 
that genealogical analysis uses history, among others, to avoid being seduced by the web 
of stories, legends, myths, and narratives, all of which conceal what is “really” going on 
(Foucault 1984; Jørgensen 2007, pp. 70-73). Genealogical analysis seeks to go beyond 
imagined truths like for example, stories of heroes and scoundrels, rational explanations, 
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romanticism, images and so on. Genealogical analysis seeks to tear off such masks and 
map actual events in their correct chronological order, in the proper context, and with a 
proper description of who is involved, and what part they play. This includes the winners, 
the losers, the marginalized and the privileged. Power analysis demonstrates the 
complexity, the contradictions and the paradoxes in relation to who people are and how 
they have become who they are. It reveals that people are part of history and as such are 
subjected to influences and pressures to behave in particular ways. It demonstrates how 
people are capable of practically anything in order to promote their own intentions and 
interests. They cooperate, they work hard, they do great things but they also argue, they 
struggle, they exploit, they deceive and they lie. Their narratives are conceived as 
constructions and masks, which may only provide a one-eyed and a narcissistic 
representation of who people are. But this aspect of narrating is not only necessarily only 
due to the promotion of particular interests and intentions. It may also be caused by the 
simple fact that some peoples’ realities are almost unbearable. In this way imagined 
identities – and thus sagas, stories and narratives – are a way out, so to speak, a way of 
coping with difficult everyday realities. They provide a way of maintaining a human face 
that allows the suffering individual to rebuff rationalization, control, oppression and 
exploitation (Gabriel, 2000; see also Pritchard, Jones and Stablein, 2004, p 219). As such 
it is also clear that relations of power may influence the sense continuity embedded in our 
realities. The postmodern approach emphasizes discontinuity as an important part of 
existence today; it implies that we move from a more continuous and consistent approach 
to reality construction to a more discontinuous and inconsistent approach, which is a view 
point that Boje has presented with the notion of antenarrative (Boje 2001). The problem 
of integration thus becomes an important management challenge in the (post)modern 
society. According to Boje, antenarrative denotes”…the fragmented, non-linear, 
incoherent, collective, unplotted and pre-narrative speculation, a bet” (Boje 2001, p. 1). 
He introduces antenarrative analysis as a solution to the crisis in modern narrative 
methods. Antenarrative analysis is thus the analysis of stories”…that are too 
unconstructed and fragmented to be analyzed in traditional approaches” (Boje 2001, p. 1). 
Story is before (ante) narrative, and it relates to Ricouer’s work in the sense that “ … the 
followability of a story allows us to look at antenarration before the emplotment of story, 
and to search for pre-understanding before the story becomes followable” (Boje 2001, p. 
2). Antenarrative is interesting in that it in many ways captures one of the management 
challenges in the postmodern world, which in many ways have actualized the concept IC. 
The actualization of antenarrative analysis expresses increasing fragmentation and a 
higher degree of internal tensions between the many small ”stories” and thereby a higher 
degree of tension in our identities. This approach to reality construction is connected to 
the second amendment proposed by Cunliffe, Luhmann and Boje to Ricouer’s approach. 
This amendment emphasizes multiplicity. 
 
Be it resolved that perpetual referring within the threefold mimesis occurs 
across past, present, and future time and context, resulting in multiple threads 
of earlier narratives (M1) weaving together into multiple present 
emplotments (M2), and continually recreating multiple futures 
(M3).(Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 273-274). 
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The need for this second amendment is according to Cunliffe, Luhmann and Boje that 
Ricouer has not to any sufficient degree discussed the dynamics within the mimetic circle 
– a dynamic which creates “polyphonic, negotiated narrative” (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 
2004, p. 274). That is, this amendment emphasizes a higher degree of multiplicity of 
interpretations, which perhaps a more important feature of the plural, paradoxical, 
inconsistent and opaque global world (Bauman 2004). Integration of facts, logic, values 
and communication cannot in other words be taken for granted. Integration has perhaps 
become fragile in the innovative economy and as such integration constitutes an 
important management challenge in general and particularly an important IC-
management challenge. How integration is accomplished is a complex and continuous 
management task, which cannot be resolved once and for all. We hope that by providing 
a new framework for understanding IC-management, IC-managers will become more 
reflexive of their talk and actions. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has proposed a new framework for understanding IC-management. According 
to this framework, we construct reality by integrating four dimensions: facts, logic, values 
and communication. Inspired by Ricouer’s work on narrative and time, we have argued 
that integration in the model is a narrative process by which time becomes human time 
and where integration is a mimetic circle, where actors create a meaningful story (plot) 
from a diversity of events or incidents. Through this framework we have argued that IC-
management is to work with narrative integration of facts, logic, values and 
communication, where the challenge of IC-management is to create the conditions for 
construction of sustainable realities. Through a postmodern critique of the mimetic circle, 
we have argued that this has become a central management challenge in the post-modern 
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